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Abstract: 
 
This policy brief examines the implementation to date of the Lisbon Treaty's provisions 
for EU external policy, in particular the High Representative/Commission Vice President 
and the External Action Service. Numerous challenges inherent to the structure of the 
system are becoming apparent already, involving as they are complex trade-offs both 
between EU  institutions and among the Member States. The EU's ability to act as a 
coherent external actor will be tested only after the new 'system' takes a clearer shape. 
This may take time and require adjustments along the way - while the rapid evolution of 
the international system and dramatic power shifts at the global level require both 
immediate action and strategic vision.   4 
The domain of external relations and foreign policy is, arguably, the one most 
affected by the new Treaty. This is true for Lisbon's letter and spirit, but even more so for 
its implementation. It could even be said that its actual implementation - inasmuch as it 
requires additional negotiations and trade-offs,  both among the Member States and 
between all EU institutions – could be as important as the original drafting of the Treaty 
text. The eventual shape of the new 'system' - unlikely to become fully visible until 2013 
- will define the Lisbon Treaty's ambition to make the EU a more coherent and effective 
international player. 
To start with, the Treaty envisages a role in this domain for the newly created 
President of the European Council. Such a role, however, is not spelt out in detail in the 
text (probably intentional, given the lack of consensus on the actual scope of the 
President's future mandate). This helped fuel the controversy which erupted in the 
aftermath of the eventual ratification of the treaty in the autumn of 2009, over whether 
the appointee should be a 'President' or rather a 'Chairman' of the European Council. Both 
the choice of Herman Van Rompuy and the first steps he has taken in this particular 
domain seem to point to an intermediate option, which will be further tested in the 
months to come, also in light of other developments. 
Interestingly, Van Rompuy has tried so far to articulate an autonomous and 
original analysis of the new international environment in which the Union operates: he 
has especially highlighted the political effects of globalization and the challenges they   5 
pose to Europe
1
                                                 
1 For example, in his speeches at the College of Europe (Bruges, 25 February 2010) and at the Brussels 
Forum of the German Marshall Fund (Brussels, 26 March 2010), available at 
; he has sought to find his own role on the diplomatic scene, especially at 
summit meetings, and he has tried to spur the Member States to discussing openly and at 
the highest level the current state and the future of EU relations with the big global 
players, starting with a special European Council meeting convened for 16 September 
2010. 
It goes without saying that the President of the Commission will continue to play 
a crucial role in external relations, especially if the growing range of policy issues 
coming under that heading is considered. The realities of the 21st century make the 
traditional notion of "foreign policy" as just being a combination of skillful diplomacy 
and military force rather obsolete. For their part, such issues as climate action, financial 
supervision, border and migration control, and international justice have climbed ever 
further up the global agenda, thus conferring on the Commission new functions in the 
wider realm of external policies, and its President a key coordinating function - also in 
terms of representation in international bodies and fora. This means that the external 
dimension of hitherto primarily internal  common policies (single market, JHA, 
environment, energy, and of course trade) may well come to represent simultaneously an 





http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/csm_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/113630.pdf respectively.    6 
1. The HR/VP 
Yet it is equally evident that the cornerstone of the new EU system in the domain of 
external action is the creation of the position of High Representative (HR) of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a hybrid institutional figure combining: a) the 
pioneering role previously played by Javier Solana as High Representative for CFSP 
(1999-2009); b) that of a Vice-President (VP) of the Commission in charge of external 
relations and coordinating other relevant portfolios; and c) the role hitherto played by the 
Foreign Minister of the country holding the rotating EU Presidency - namely, chairing the 
Council formation dealing with Foreign Affairs at large [artt.17-18 TEU et al.], now 
separate from the General Affairs Council. To these various responsibilities in the 
CFSP/CSDP area should be added chairing the Boards of domain-relevant agencies such 
as the European Defence Agency, the EU Satellite Centre, the EU Institute for Security 
Studies and the European Security and Defence College (ESDC).  
The new HR/VP  is, however, no longer also the Secretary-General of the 
Council of the EU. Indeed this is a function that Solana hardly carried out himself in 
practice during his ten-year mandate, preferring to leave this to his longtime deputy, 
Pierre de Boissieu
2. Nor is Catherine Ashton - contrary to Solana - also the Secretary-
General of the Western European Union (WEU), as the new Commission ‘hat’ made that 
impossible
3
                                                 
2 De Boissieu was indeed appointed Council Secretary-General in November 2009 and will stay in office 
until June 2011. He will be succeeded by Uwe Corsepius. 
3 For WEU a pragmatic solution was adopted, whereby the Head of the residual Secretariat in Brussels, 
Arnaud Jacomet, has been appointed Acting Secretary-General, while the Ambassadors to the EU Political 
and Security Committee from the ten WEU full members (Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) have kept their second 'hat' as Ambassadors to 
WEU. 
.    7 
Last but certainly not least, Catherine Ashton has a legal right of initiative in 
both her capacities –  as HR only (in strictly CFSP matters) and/or as double-hatted 
HR/VP [art.22.2 TEU]. Such a multi-hatted position represents a unique opportunity to 
bring coherence to the Union's "foreign policy" but also a daunting challenge for the post 
holder - especially the first one. When Catherine Ashton accepted the European Council's 
nomination on 19 November 2009
4
                                                 
4 After UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband refused the post, in late October 2009, the British 
government came up with three names: Business Secretary Peter Mandelson (also former European 
Commissioner for Trade), former Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon, and notably Baroness Ashton, who had 
replaced Mandelson in the Commission a year earlier and, therefore, was already a member of the College. 
Art. 18 TUE would have allowed a ballot by QMV, but the appointment – which included Van Rompuy's - 
was consensual. Ashton started right away as HR but had to wait until the parliamentary confirmation of 
the whole new Commission to exercise fully her VP function, although she 'switched' her Commission 
portfolio with that of the outgoing Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero Waldner almost 
immediately.  
, she probably did not realise how intractable the job 
description was due to become. A few months into it, she must now be aware of the 
urgent need to put in place a structure that will allow her to delegate administrative, 
operational and even representational tasks to a number of deputies (de facto though not 
de jure), leaving her free to concentrate on policy coordination and strategic leadership.  
This is also why the establishment of the  European External Action Service 
(EEAS) has taken centre stage and is bound to become the centerpiece of the new 'system' 
as well as the quintessential catalyst of all the issues that have haunted European "foreign 
policy" for its first two decades. Following arrangements made after the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty, the service is also expected to support both President Van Rompuy 
and President Barroso (along with the whole Commission) in their external functions. 
   8 
1.1 Inside the College  
The HR/VP is a full member of the Commission and is expected to generate 
policy coordination and coherence not only within the College – albeit under the control 
of President Barroso - but also at Directorate-General level. When the new Commission 
was nominated  by the President (27 November 2009) and later appointed by the 
European Parliament (9 February 2010), this translated into conferring  on  Catherine 
Ashton a role of a 'prima inter pares' - if anything, by virtue of her double investiture (by 
the European Council as High Representative and by the Parliament as COM Vice-
President) - among her fellow College members dealing with external policies proper. 
Interestingly, she was called upon to "coordinate" the Commissioners for 
Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy (Stefan Fuele), for Development (Andris 
Piebalgs), and for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
(Kristalina Georgieva). The EU treaties do not allow for a formal hierarchy among 
Commissioners (bar the President), but Ashton's special place has been acknowledged – 
while Commissioner Piebalgs (the only one among them to have already served a full 
mandate in the Barroso-I College) was designated to represent the Commission proper on 
the Foreign Affairs Council now chaired by the HR/VP.  
Further details as to exactly how such "coordination" would work in practice 
were left to subsequent decisions, including those regarding the EEAS. It is also worth 
mentioning that the new Trade Commissioner (Karel de Gucht) was explicitly exempted 
from such coordination - as were other College members whose portfolios have external 
ramifications - thus leaving the President of the Commission, and the College as a whole,   9 
the ultimate task of bringing about coherence across the entire range of EU common 
policies.  
Catherine Ashton is not the only VP, although she stands out as the most senior 
one (thanks also to her formal membership of the European Council): there are six others. 
So it is worth noting that the College recently (16 April) approved the creation of a series 
of "Groups of Commissioners", starting notably with one on external relations chaired by 
Ashton and encompassing not only Piebalgs, Fuele, Georgieva, but also de Gucht and the 
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs Olli Rehn, with the possible 
association of others at a later stage
5
Firstly, while the broad traits of the EEAS had already been agreed upon in early 
2003 (within the framework of the Convention on the Future of Europe), concrete talks 
over its actual implementation started only in early 2010. Thus many years were lost 
. 
 
2. The EEAS 
The establishment of the EEAS - as foreseen by the Treaty [Art.27 TEU] - and its precise 
nature, status, scope and set-up were to (and have indeed) become the object of additional 
negotiations whose outcome will inevitably mark the direction the EU will take in its 
external action in the next decade. Three paradoxes deserve to be highlighted in this 
respect. 
                                                 
5 The Commissioners' Groups are established to ensure good preparation of certain key initiatives. Each 
Group is chaired by a lead Commissioner and meant to work on the basis of a mandate from the President 
setting out its purpose and the 'products' to be delivered. Groups are not to take decisions but to prepare for   10 
without engaging in serious discussions, as the few preparatory meetings devoted to the 
EEAS in early 2005 (right before the failed referenda on the then Constitutional Treaty in 
France and the Netherlands brought them to a halt) produced very little indeed
6
                                                                                                                                            
collegiate deliberations, and they will include the President's Cabinet and the Commission's Secretariat-
General [Note d'information de M. le President, SEC (2010) 475, 16 avril 2010 – revised on 21 April].  
6 The resulting papers can be consulted in the Annex to Graham.Avery and Antonio Missiroli (eds.), The 
EU Foreign Service: How to Build a More Effective Common Policy, EPC Working Paper 28, Brussels, 
November 2007, pp. 82 ff (www.epc.eu).  
. 
Similarly, the further paralysis generated by the first Irish referendum on Lisbon in June 
2008 put all relevant talks on ice until the autumn of 2009. As a result, by early 2010 all 
players were under huge pressure to deliver quickly on an issue that raises intricate and at 
times intractable problems. The main institutional players, however, had used those five 
‘wasted’ years to consolidate, even reinvigorate their bureaucratic (red) lines of defense 
and resistance to change. 
Secondly, the relevant provisions in the Treaty have proved to be, at the same 
time, too specific and too vague: too specific when the one-third rule of the thumb was 
laid down (whereby the EEAS should come to incorporate, in roughly equal shares, staff 
from the relevant Commission DGs, the Council Secretariat, and the Member States' 
foreign ministries), and too vague regarding the possible nature and location of the EEAS 
in the EU 'system'. On top of that, the array of players involved in making the relevant 
decision(s) is unusually wide, encompassing not only the EU-27 and the Commission 
(through the COREPER, the Council, and the entire College in its own right) but also the 
European Parliament - in particular regarding staff regulations and budgetary procedures 
(both subject to co-decision) - thus generating potholes and roadblocks rather than paving 
the way for progress.   11 
The third and final paradox: a somewhat artificial deadline (30 April 2010) was 
set for the 'founding' Decision on the EEAS. However, while it is expected that the EEAS 
will be launched as soon as possible, its actual implementation and development will 
inevitably require constant monitoring, review and, quite possibly, further legislative and 
organisational adjustments within a few years. In other words, while the EEAS can only 
take shape gradually and as part of work in progress, its foundations must be laid down in 
a hurried and one-off legislative procedure. The sheer complexity of the issues to be 
addressed to make the service work properly demands time and adequate preparation. 
But, paradoxically, any major delay to its launch is likely to be seen - both inside and 
outside the Union - as evidence of infighting, disarray and potential failure. 
2.1 The making 
The main steps in the establishment of the EEAS since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty (or, more precisely, since the 'Yes' vote in the second Irish referendum, on 
2 October 2009, that paved the way for its eventual ratification) have been the following: 
-  on 20 October MEP Elmar Brok presented the first draft Report on the 
institutional aspects of the creation of the EEAS. The main emphasis in both the Report 
and the ensuing discussion was on the (desirable) proximity of the new service to the 
Commission – with some MEPs going as far as to argue for its location within it – and on 
tight parliamentary control over its personnel and  budget, especially regarding 
development aid policy. Slightly differing views were expressed on the possible full 
inclusion of the existing politico-military structures in the EEAS. The report was 
eventually adopted in the Plenary Session on 22 October 2009 by 424 votes to 94;   12 
- on 23 October the Swedish EU Presidency, in turn, came up with its own 
Report, as broadly agreed upon in the COREPER (after preliminary talks at Antici 
Counselors’ level). Although not strictly binding for the HR/VP and future deliberations, 
the Presidency Report set the stage for the ensuing debate by addressing the scope of the 
EEAS' activities, its legal status, staffing, financing, and the organization of EU 
Delegations abroad. It also mentioned 30 April 2010 as a tentative deadline for finalizing 
the relevant decision at General Affairs Council level, building on a draft proposal to be 
put forward by the new HR/VP
7
- to this end, once Catherine Ashton was appointed and later confirmed by the 
European Parliament as a member of the new College of Commissioners, a dedicated 
'High Level Group' was formed to support the HR/VP in her initial task
;  
8
                                                 
7 The full text is available at 
. Shortly 
afterwards, a Special Adviser was also appointed to assist the HR/VP in her preparatory 
work, namely the former Danish Permanent Representative (and former Commission 
official) Poul Skytte Christoffersen; 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st14/st14930.en09.pdf . The 
April deadline was probably dictated also by concerns about a possible change of government in the UK 
(following parliamentary elections due in May 2010) and its repercussions on the whole Lisbon foreign 
policy 'package' – although Conservative leaders later gave assurances as to their compliance with EU 
decisions in this domain. 
8 Chaired by Ashton, the group encompassed  the two Secretaries-General, Catherine Day (COM) and 
Pierre de Boissieu; the two relevant Directors-General, Joao Vale de Almeida (DG Relex) and Robert 
Cooper (DG E); the Heads of the respective Legal Services; Patrick Child (Head of all EC/EU Delegations 
in third countries) and Helga Schmid (Director of the Council's Policy Unit); James Morrison, Ashton's 
Head of  Cabinet; and representatives of the 'trio' presidencies involved in the Council negotiations (Spain, 
Belgium and, from January 2011, Hungary) - that is, all the key players but the EP, whose formal role in 
shaping the decision was not on the same footing as the Council and the Commission.   13 
- the following phase, from early February onwards, was characterised by the 
circulation of a number of draft documents (from the HR/VP-led steering group)
9, 
position papers and statements (mostly from MEPs) and media articles that conveyed an 
impression of lingering confusion and ongoing turf battles
10
- finally, however, the 25 March General Affairs Council produced a "proposal 
for a Council Decision"
. The general climate was 
hardly helped by the Commission's unilateral appointment, on 17 February 2010, of João 
Vale de Almeida (a close aide to President Barroso) as new Head of the EU Delegation to 
Washington D.C. - an appointment that, although legally legitimate at that stage, raised 
loud political criticism from Member States, seen as it was as a preemptive strike; 
11
As things stood in late April 2010, therefore, the likely chassis of the EEAS - 
defined in the draft decision as "a functionally autonomous body" - would consist of: 
, subsequently followed on 26 April by some amendments that 
reflected the outcome of further negotiations between EU bodies and among the Member 
States. On the basis of this blueprint, formal consultations have been opened with the 
European Parliament, while the College of Commissioners is expected to approve the 
deal shortly. 
2.2 The design 
                                                 
9 In mid-late February, for instance, separate drafts were circulated on the "vision", the functioning and the 
organizational structure of the EEAS: they still presented alternative options for the most controversial 
points in the ongoing talks. 
10 In particular, MEPs Elmar Brok (Foreign Affairs Committee) and Guy Verhofstadt (Constitutional 
Affairs Committee) co-signed on 18 March 2010 a ‘non-paper’ demanding i.a. a status for the EEAS that 
would still make its link with and eventual integration into the Commission possible, and the creation of 
three ‘political’ deputies for the HR/VP alongside the three Commissioners Fuele, Piebalgs and Georgieva. 
Other MEPs demanded at some stage the separation between ACP countries (to remain with the 
Commission) and the other geographical desks (to be moved to the EEAS). Extensive reporting on these 
developments can be found in www.europeanvoice.com; www.euobserver.com; www.europolitics.info; 
www.euractiv.fr.   14 
- a sui generis stand-alone structure, distinct from both the Commission and the 
Council, i.e. a "service" in its own right - whose status and modus operandi will be 
original and distinct from existing models, and whose budget will be comparable to that 
of an "autonomous institution" (EP permitting). The HR/VP is to be the sole "appointing 
authority"; 
- an organisational 'cockpit' encompassing the HR/VP as "appointing authority", 
and a sort of 'triumvirate' including: 1) an Executive Secretary-General (along the lines of 
most national foreign ministries), in charge of key 'horizontal' and management 
functions
12
- officials from the Council Secretariat (especially DG E) and the Commission 
(in particular DG RELEX), who will maintain their status and privileges, and diplomats 
from the Member States - whose eventual share is expected to amount to "at least" one 
, flanked by two main deputies: 2) one would be a Managing Director for 
Political Affairs, with hands-on responsibility for the CFSP/CSDP domain; and 3) the 
other would be in charge of the various geographical desks (and would probably come 
from the ranks of the Commission). Still, within such a 'cockpit' no formal hierarchy 
would be established (although the Executive SG would act as a ‘primus inter pares’, for 
instance by deputising for Ashton in her absence. In turn, the HR/VP would form a sort 
of "corporate board" encompassing not only the members of the 'triumvirate' but also the 
PSC Chairperson (who, according to art.38 TEU, must be a representative of the HR) and 
her Head of Cabinet; 
                                                                                                                                            
11 http://eeas.europa.eu/docs/eeas_draft_decision_250310_en.pdf  
12 The 25 March proposal mentioned simply a ‘Secretary-General’ "assisted" by two deputies, but 
especially MEPs objected that only institutions (such as the Council and the Commission, but also e.g. 
NATO) have a proper SG. Some member states also disliked such a pyramidal structure - typical for 
instance of the Quai d'Orsay - with an all-powerful administrative figure at the top.   15 
third of all AD levels by 2013 - selected on the basis of their competence while also 
maintaining the principle of "the broadest possible geographical balance”
13
- the 136 EU (formerly EC) Delegations in third countries and international 
organisations, whose Heads will be directly accountable to the HR/VP [artt.32, 35 TUE] 
and her 'triumvirate'. While a single chain of command is expected to be in place in each 
Delegation, further arrangements are likely to be hammered out regarding the position of 
those officials belonging to Commission DGs, such as Trade, that are not under Ashton's 
coordinating authority, and who have (and may wish) to receive separate instructions 
and, to a lesser 
extent, some "gender" balance. All EEAS officials will serve under the same rules and 
obligations. For the latter component, however, tours of duty in the service should not in 
principle exceed two four-year terms. In the initial phase (until 2013) recruitment will 
take place only from within the ranks of the three 'founding' components, whereas after 
this date also other officials and experts (including from the EP) will also be entitled to 
apply; 
- an additional number of officials to be recruited on a shorter-term basis as 
"seconded national experts" (SNEs) but not included in the one-third quota reserved to 
the Member States - as well as an unspecified number of "special envoys", likely to 
replace the current "Special" and "Personal" Representatives of the HR - but still without 
a well-defined profile and position inside the EEAS [art.33 TEU]. These, in particular, 
may or may not be also 'double-hatted' as Heads of Delegations abroad, following a 
couple of recent precedents;  
                                                 
13 This means that the staff will comprise "a meaningful presence of nationals" from all Member States, 
although formal country quotas will not be discussed or negotiated.   16 
flowing down from their direct Brussels hierarchy. Finally, especially after the 
controversy over the Delegation to the US, transparent and collectively acceptable criteria 
will have to be agreed for top appointments in key third countries. 
2.3 The unknowns 
It also remains to be seen the extent to which the general principle, set at the 
beginning, of ‘single’ geographical desks unified within the EEAS will be met in 
practice, as a number of exceptions have already been made. This may also have an 
impact on the overall size of the EEAS, which is not mentioned anywhere (yet). While 
tentative figures circulated by the media stretch from 2 000 to 8 000, eventual numbers 
will of course depend also on available budgetary resources as well as on whether, for 
instance, local staff in the Delegations is included or not. Both the size and figures will 
become much clearer, however, only when the EEAS reaches "cruising speed". The 
official deadline for that has now become 2013, which incidentally coincides with the 
expiry date of the current EU Financial Perspectives (2007-2013). 
What is not clear at this stage is exactly which departments of the Council 
Secretariat-General and the relevant Commission DGs will be transferred –  however 
gradually – to the EEAS. The original thrust of the 25 March blueprint seems to have 
been diluted significantly after additional talks with the Commission and in anticipation 
of the EP (non-binding) opinion. As a result, chunks of DG Enlargement, DG External 
Relations and DG Development may remain where they are, while the entire policy area 
covered by Commissioner Georgieva (including ECHO) would seem destined to stay out   17 
of the EEAS proper. This could eventually also be the case for the management of 
external cooperation programmes. 
Last but not least, some tricky issues still have to be resolved regarding the 
actual exercise of supplementary consular functions by EU Delegations in third 
countries
14 and the functioning of the new system (once the rotational Presidency system 
is entirely done away with) in international organisations, an area in which the presence 
and status of the EC/EU vary significantly and are now further affected by the legal 
personality acquired by the Union [art.47 TEU]. In this respect, some common principles 
(and possibly also codes of conduct) may have to be established and implemented in 
order to overcome the array of different situations currently in place - even though a 
degree of gradualism looks inevitable
15
At any rate, both the EU institutions and the Member States should bear in mind 
that, when all is said and done, the strategic rationale and ultimate ambition behind the 
establishment of the EEAS was (and still is) the creation of a common culture and 
practice among European officials and diplomats. In other words, beyond the current turf 
battles and bureaucratic politicking, the EEAS is meant to become also an instrument for 
the cross-fertilisation of foreign policy-making across the EU and the inter-changeability 
between national and European administrations. 
. 
                                                 
14 Some Member States appear now lukewarm on principle and/or reluctant to mobilize additional (human 
and financial) resources to that end – despite the commitments made at the outset.  
15 Arguably, the most intricate case in the patchwork of arrangements in this domain is the United Nations, 
where the EU as such is considered an international organisation in its own right: as a consequence, each 
enhancement of its status is seen as a precedent also for other regional groupings (e.g. the Arab League). 
Even there, however, the previous EC Delegation recently merged with the Office of the Council 
Secretariat created a few years ago and was put under a single Head, now double-hatted (Ambassador 
Pedro Serrano). An ad hoc arrangement with the Spanish EU Presidency, the other Member States 
represented on the Security Council and the UNSC Chair allowed Catherine Ashton to take the floor there   18 
2.4 The challenges 
This highlights a further paradox of the current situation. In fact, while all the 
preparatory documents insist equally on both the one-third rule and the principle of 
budgetary "neutrality" for the EEAS, it is quite evident already at this stage that the two 
are hardly compatible one with the other. If one looks at the rough figures on the relative 
size of the three main components of the service, DG Relex and the Commission 
Delegations far outnumber the relevant staff from the Council Secretariat (the ratio is in 
the region of 5:1 or higher), whereas the arrival of a comparable number of diplomats 
from the EU-27 would put unbearable pressure on the current budget.  
There are, however, huge imbalances also among the member states - in terms of 
both quantity and quality of eligible personnel. The pool of available officials varies 
enormously between, say, Germany and Malta, and so does their level of experience and 
expertise. As a result, the procedure of selecting national diplomats 'fit for the service' is 
likely to be subject to innumerable variables and pressures. And this will prove 
particularly tricky especially in the start-up phase, when differences in background, 
culture, approach and also incentives - not only amongst the EU-27 but also between 
them and EU officials - will be biggest. Over time, as the EEAS develops and grows, 
such imbalances and differences are expected to narrow. Common training
16
                                                                                                                                            
on 4 May on behalf of the EU - perhaps not an absolute premiere in practical terms (Javier Solana had done 
that on a number of occasions in the past), but certainly one for the HR/VP and the Union per se. 
 and rotation 
on the job will contribute to reducing them further. 
16 Here, too, the European Parliament has been pushing for the creation of a sort of European Diplomatic 
Academy – and has encountered strong opposition from both the Commission and the Member States, 
especially those keen on preserving or even enhancing their national ‘champions’ in this domain. It seems 
therefore likely that, at least in the initial years, the example of the ESDC may be followed, with specific   19 
This is why it is certainly wise to plan - as has already been done - a first Report 
on the implementation of the EEAS already in 2012, and a more substantial and stringent 
review (possibly leading to a new decision) by the end of 2013 at the latest – also within 
the context of the new Multi-Annual Financial Framework. 
Furthermore, any initial decision cannot possibly enshrine all the 'evolutionary' 
aspects of the service - regarding inter alia recruitment and training requirements, career 
patterns inside and outside the EEAS proper, rotation between the Brussels 'headquarters' 
and the Delegations -  which are likely to trigger additional attempts to modify the 
structure and its procedures in the months to follow. 
All this, however, contributes to highlighting the crucial role that formal talks 
with the European Parliament play in the eventual delivery of the decision and the actual 
launch of the EEAS. Formally speaking, the EP has co-decision rights only on such 
aspects as the budgetary procedures and the staff regulations – plus, of course, an overall 
say on the budget. In principle, therefore, the decision could be taken by the General 
Affairs Council (unanimously), chaired by the rotating Presidency, with the collegial 
consent of the Commission and after simply "consulting" the Strasbourg Assembly. In 
practice, however, the EEAS can take off only after a comprehensive inter-institutional 
compromise - and the EP has made it clear that it must be a package deal. 
This is why additional and thorough negotiations with the parliamentary party 
group and committee leaders are required, thus not only postponing the finalization of the 
Council Decision per se, but possibly also affecting its overall design. In fact, different 
                                                                                                                                            
modules being offered by different national and also EU centres (such as the College of Europe in   20 
positions have emerged among MEPs over time, and it is difficult to guess what the terms 
of a final deal may be. It seems plausible, however, that the Council Decision will be 
formally adopted before the summer break and the remaining regulations not long 
thereafter, thus permitting the launch of the EEAS and the appointment of its top officials 
within a year from the entry into force of the Treaty...  
All of this only goes to show, however, how similar the role of the EP in the new 
EU system is becoming to that of Congress in the US, and how transparency and 
legitimacy may not always (or necessarily) rhyme with efficiency and consistency. The 
launch and development of the EEAS, in other words, will probably occupy the entire 
term of all the new post-Lisbon institutions - Parliament included - and possibly turn into 
the most important test of their success. 
 
3. The new system 
Apart from and beyond the EEAS set-up, a number of political and functional unknowns 
still linger over the new external action 'system' created by the Lisbon Treaty. As already 
mentioned, some have to do with the internal functioning of the Commission and the 
overall scope of the Union's external action. Some others have to do with personalities, 
i.e. whether Van Rompuy, Barroso and Ashton will get along (or not), and especially 
whether they will achieve a modus vivendi that is sustainable and, above all, beneficial 
for the EU as a whole.  
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There are unknowns regarding the foreign ministries of the Member States, who 
will be confronted with new challenges in terms of both influence and staffing. Some of 
them will face up to painful dilemmas: should they send "the best and the brightest" to 
the EEAS or keep them, and with what incentives in either case? All of them will have to 
be offered terms of engagement conducive to making them responsible stakeholders in 
the new system. This will of course not apply only to the institutional set-up: as such the 
HR/VP and the EEAS will not generate a common EU policy vis-à-vis, say, Russia or 
China (at best, they will facilitate its shaping and implementation) unless the Member 
States 'buy' into the new system politically. 
Some additional problems may still lie with the residual role and competences of 
the rotating EU Presidency. While the new system, once fully in place, will be entirely 
'Brussels-ised', in terms of both location and impulse, individual Member States will still 
be chairing on a six-month rotational basis both the COREPER and some Council 
formations that may be relevant for the Union's overall external action. Moreover, a 
‘niche’ role may have to be devised - whether on an ad hoc basis or more systematically 
– for the Prime Minister (occasionally also the President) and the Foreign Minister of the 
country holding the six monthly presidency in order, once again, to keep them on board 
and give them a degree of responsibility and visibility without reneging on the political 
rationale that led to the new Treaty provisions in this domain
17
                                                 
17 The Foreign Minister could for instance – the possibility has already been floated and partially tested 
during the Spanish Presidency – deputise for the HR/VP whenever her agenda makes attending a given 
event impossible. If turned into a formal rule, however, this could give the impression that the 'old' system 
is still in place. On the other hand, it is already accepted that such 'deputisation' is appropriate in the 
European Parliament whenever matters related to CFSP proper – as distinct from former EC matters, for 
which the relevant Commissioner would be called upon – are discussed. 
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For its part, the European Parliament will inevitably become a more important 
institutional player in external action and foreign policy at large. Not only will it set 
conditions on the establishment of the EEAS proper, but it will also try to have a bigger 
say on expenditure, appointments and policy guidelines. Its clout in neighbouring policy 
areas has also increased, be it internal security (as the dispute over i.a. SWIFT has 
proved), trade (the EP has acquired the right to approve or reject agreements), energy and 
even agriculture (now subject to co-decision). Only time will tell whether all this is 
transforming the assembly into a sort of "EU Congress", with all the repercussions that 
this could have in terms of inter-institutional relations and policy-making. 
3.1 Tests and trends 
In terms of policy, it is still unclear how the CSDP (formerly ESDP) dimension 
of the Union's external action will develop. The Lisbon Treaty creates a more 'permissive' 
framework in this domain, where a number of enabling clauses would permit new 
arrangements and initiatives to be put in place. Interestingly, the only case so far in which 
the new provisions have already had an impact is the decision, taken through a 
unanimous Declaration by the ten Ambassadors sitting on the WEU Council on 31 March 
2010, to "terminate" the organisation as an indirect consequence of the entry into force of 
art.42 TEU, which enshrines a qualified mutual defence clause
18
While most new articles basically envisage initiatives and developments that 
have already been launched and implemented ahead of the entry into force of the Treaty - 
.  
                                                 
18 The decision was floated by the Dutch government already in 2003, in anticipation of the expected entry 
into force of the Constitutional Treaty, then put on ice until late 2009. Its actual implementation, however, 
may still take until late 2011, due especially to the complications related to the dismantling of the WEU 
Parliamentary Assembly based in Paris.   23 
be it the expansion of the scope of the so-called "Petersberg tasks" [art.43], the conduct 
of EU peace-building operations by only some Member States [art.44], or the 
establishment of the EDA [art.45], created already in 2004 –  the scheme envisaging 
"permanent structured cooperation" in defence matters [artt.42.6-46 TEU and related 
Protocol] represents a novelty that will put the willingness of the Member States to 
cooperate and integrate further in this domain to a decisive test. In all likelihood, much 
will depend on the prevailing views in Great Britain – without whose full engagement 
and commitment CSDP would be hard to pursue effectively, both politically and 
functionally.  
This said, the Lisbon Treaty does offer a unique opportunity to generate not only 
better coordination and coherence, but even synergy between all the different aspects of 
the Union's external action: within CSDP, between its civilian and military spheres; 
within CFSP, between diplomacy and crisis management proper; and, more broadly, 
between all the various levers and instruments of "foreign policy" the Union has, in 
principle, at its disposal. 
A key test of the post-Lisbon system will indeed be the actual functioning of 
these new 'hybrid' structures and figures, starting with the HR/VP and the EEAS. Such 
'hybrid-isation' represents the biggest innovation in the Treaty and, arguably, also its 
hardest ordeal. Failure to produce significant added value or, worse still, an increase in 
personal and bureaucratic infighting at the top would cast a gloomy shadow over the 
Union's international image and action and would also have negative repercussions on the 
broader EU internal political and institutional climate. Conversely, if the new system 
proves capable (over time) to improve on the effectiveness and also legitimacy of the   24 
Union on the international stage, the 'hybrid' model could well be extended, both 
downstream and upstream. 
This may also have a bearing on the highest level of the Union's system. It is 
already apparent that both international relations at large and EU policy-making are 
becoming increasingly ‘presidential’: the key decisions are taken by Heads of State and 
Government, in line also with developments in domestic politics. 'Brussels-isation' and 
'Presidentialisation' are the other main trends that could possibly characterise European 
policy-making in the years to come. This is why another big test for the Lisbon Treaty in 
this domain will be the interplay between the two Presidents, Van Rompuy and Barroso: 
the way in which they will cooperate and/or compete; the way in which their role(s) will 
be perceived both internally and externally; and the extent to which they will rely (or not) 
upon the EEAS structures. 
 
4. The new environment 
This said, the real test will probably come from outside the Union. The new Treaty and 
the resulting structures are only a necessary but still insufficient condition for a more 
effective external action of the EU. Their impact on the system remains difficult to assess 
in full, yet their implementation will not occur  in a vacuum: it will be significantly 
influenced and shaped by external challenges. 
Last December's Copenhagen fiasco (all the more painful as the EU presented 
itself as a global leader in tackling climate change) and the emergence of the so-called   25 
BASIC  powers; the broader difficulties encountered by multilateralism in several 
domains, including trade and disarmaments; and the recent troubles in the Euro zone 
itself have all highlighted a simple fact: in global terms, the European continent is in 
relative decline, geopolitically as well as economically. Events and developments are 
increasingly shaped elsewhere and often not in line with 'old' Europe's interests and 
values. As a result, both the Union as a whole and its individual Member States 
(including the bigger ones) risk marginalization and irrelevance.  
Paradoxically, after fostering interdependence as a peace project (such was the 
essence of European integration over the past half century), the EU now feels vulnerable 
to interdependence at the global level. Interdependence, however, exists not only between 
different areas of the world: it is growing also between policy issues, both within and 
across regions. Action against climate change cannot be effectively coordinated 
worldwide without addressing trade-related problems. Regulation of financial markets in 
one country (or continent) is virtually impossible and, at any rate, requires reforming the 
existing international financial institutions. Migration flows cannot be governed without 
adequate development and human security-related policies. Nuclear non-proliferation 
initiatives need to be credibly linked to more forward-looking global approaches to 
energy security. And durable peace cannot be guaranteed without justice and 
reconciliation. 
In other words, external and foreign policies are no longer what they used to be, 
nor are they neatly separable. For their part, the existing international institutions seem 
incapable of connecting all the dots: multilateral bodies are too specialised and too 
fragmented. The WTO 'does' trade; various UN agencies and the World Bank 'do'   26 
development; the IMF 'does' finance; the UNSC 'does' peace and security; the IAEA 
'does' non-proliferation; the ailing G-8 and the fledgling G-20 'do' this and that, but 
nothing decisively - yet.  
Furthermore, in virtually all these bodies and fora, Europeans are largely over-
represented (especially in light of recent economic trends and political developments) 
and, more often than not, under-performing. They make for one third of the UNSC (two 
permanent plus three non-permanent seats), one third of the G-20, and one third of voting 
shares in the IMF, i.e. almost twice as much as the US and ten times as China (taken 
together, the euro zone countries alone have nearly one fourth, and are still represented 
individually also on the IMF Board). This hardly reflects the current balance of power in 
the world, even less its foreseeable evolution in the years to come. And such mismatch 
contributes to weakening the same multilateral system the EU claims to be so attached to, 
as most emerging powers - including large democracies like India, Brazil or South Africa 
- no longer accept its current set-up. 
4.1 Less Europeans, more EU 
A more effective 'Europe' in the world needs the Lisbon Treaty as its starting 
point. Yet a more effective multilateral system needs fewer Europeans and more EU: in 
order to retain (or regain) its influence, Europe must streamline its presence. This is not 
simply a matter of quantity but also of quality, and it requires sensitive and sensible 
trade-offs both inside and outside the EU. The Lisbon Treaty provides some building 
blocks, and the HR/VP and the EEAS are important cornerstones of the new edifice. 
Ultimately, however, it is the very nature of the Union that allows it, in principle at least,   27 
to connect the different dots and operate across an increasingly multi-faceted policy 
board – but only if (and it is a big 'if') its leaders fully realise that "l'Union fait la force". 
The recent arrangement between Barroso and Van Rompuy on G-8/G-20 
summits – whereby the EU as such will be represented by a single delegation
19
                                                 
19 Each will speak on matters pertaining to his own legal and political competence. In principle, therefore, 
Van Rompuy is expected to be ‘first’ President in the G-8, while Barroso continues being spokesperson for 
issues falling under Commission competence in the G-20. In terms of protocol, Van Rompuy is considered 
a Head of State. As such, he receives - though more out of accepted practice than actual design - the 
accreditation letters of new third-country Ambassadors to the EU. On the other hand, the accreditation 
letters of Heads of EU Delegations abroad (once these have been ‘appointed’ by the HR/VP) are to be 
signed by both Presidents. 
 – is a 
small inter-institutional step in the right direction and could pave the way for bigger and 
bolder ones in other international bodies. 
In fact, even with the Lisbon Treaty, the EU will probably still not have a single 
telephone number or speak with only one voice. Yet a common, well-functioning, 
Brussels-based switchboard (connecting also Catherine Ashton and the EEAS) will be of 
crucial help to the Europeans getting their act together and, possibly, contributing to the 
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